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A First Step on the Way Out of Iraq
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Michael Wahid Hanna,
World Politics Review,
7/1/2009
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The United States took an important step yesterday toward leaving Iraq by moving combat troops out of Iraqi population centers in anticipation of the June 30 deadline specified in the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).
This redeployment has focused attention on Iraq's current security situation and triggered stepped-up efforts by insurgents to undermine the symbolic importance of the transition, by launching attacks generally aimed at Shiite civilians. It has also provided fodder for those in the United States who wish to delay withdrawal.
However, looking at Iraq solely through the prism of short-term security trends clouds thinking about how the United States can best prepare for its exit from the country. It also obscures the enduring and fundamental disputes that undermine long-term prospects for stability. The United States should instead continue the transition toward diplomacy with modest goals and a focus on facilitating dialogue and negotiations on the most intractable issues facing Iraqis: governance, territory, and resources.
Make no mistake, Iraq is not on a self-correcting path to tranquility. It is likely to see a near-term increase in baseline levels of violence, and varying levels of violence for years to come.
But the logical case for withdrawal remains unchanged, starting with the binding obligation to withdraw on a fixed timetable as part of the SOFA negotiated by the Bush administration. More broadly, our expanding commitments in Afghanistan and the impact of the current economic downturn have added urgency to the need to rebalance the U.S. military posture.
Delaying withdrawals because of recent bombings would have given insurgents veto power over U.S. actions. More perilously, it would have conceded a key strategic goal of the ongoing insurgency by undercutting the legitimacy of the Iraqi government as sovereign over Iraqi territory. It would also have undermined U.S. credibility in the region at a time when the Obama administration is seeking buy-in and support for its ambitious regional agenda from partners in the Arab world.
Iraq's security gains remain fragile and reversible. But although withdrawal entails risks, there is no credible alternative. As President Obama clearly stated when announcing his timeline for troop withdrawals, "The most important decisions that have to be made about Iraq's future must now be made by Iraqis." Unfortunately, the improved security and accompanying degree of normalcy that has returned to many areas of the country has allowed complacency and overconfidence to set in among Iraqi political actors, frustrating significant political progress.
U.S. influence over the nature and pace of the Iraqi political process has considerably diminished and will wane even more as forces draw down. But it is not insignificant.
In light of current political realities in Iraq, the U.S. role going forward must necessarily be less obtrusive, predicated on diplomatic means, and focused on bolstering United Nations-led efforts at brokering political compromise. But even with a more limited role, the United States can still help to facilitate serious discussions on the pressing issues facing Iraq: the escalating ethnic disputes over the oil-rich city of Kirkuk and other disputed territories in the north; legislation establishing mechanisms for developing and sharing the country's oil wealth; a framework for dealing with the return of millions of refugees and internally displaced persons; and the integration of disaffected Sunnis— including members of the Awakening Councils and a broader spectrum of former Ba'athists—into the political process.
Such an approach could help limit the prospect that ongoing violence and political tensions may trigger broader sectarian or ethnic conflict, or contribute to the formation of a new constituency for insurgency or political violence.
The United States also has an opportunity to work with its regional allies—such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia—to increase cooperation on issues impacting Iraq and its reintegration into the Arab world. (See Michael Wahid Hanna's WPR Briefing.)
But the U.S. should also see its role in the proper perspective, lest it burden the U.S.-Iraq relationship with unsustainable expectations. Iraq will not become a "strategic foothold" for the United States, and predicating future policy on such assumptions will only lead to overreach and disappointment. Our influence in Iraq is based upon a legacy of invasion and occupation. There are areas where U.S. and Iraqi interests converge—the desire for a stable and unified country that does not threaten regional security or fuel salafi jihad or takfiri violence, for instance. But the current arrangements for cooperation and assistance are borne of necessity and do not represent a consensual alliance.
Iraqis remain divided on the very nature of the Iraqi state, and how political power and resources are to be shared among its fractious ethnic, sectarian, and political groups. It might be unrealistic to expect definitive resolution of these issues to faithfully follow the announced timetable for U.S. withdrawal.
The upcoming January 2010 national parliamentary elections, which will continue to polarize politics and ratchet up rhetorical differences, will only complicate the task. A series of political breakthroughs in the midst of what will be a hard-fought contest for political supremacy is hard to imagine. In fact, the current political dynamics are likely to skew political rivalries and complicate future negotiations.
But efforts at reaching significant political accommodation and reconciliation must be encouraged now, in the hopes that they can provide a workable foundation upon which a broad political settlement can be built—both as U.S. forces depart the country and in the years beyond.
Michael Wahid Hanna is a fellow and program officer covering international affairs at the Century Foundation. This was originally published in the World Politics Review. |
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