Various explanations have been posited to make sense of the ongoing Iraqi Army operation codenamed Sawlat al-Fursan (Attack of the Knights), which has been directed against the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) throughout the south of Iraq. Marc Lynch summarizes the various theories that have gained traction in explaining the motivations for launching the Basra offensive at this juncture, and most of the more persuasive arguments focus on the motivations and rationales of the Iraqi actors:

As part of his own theorizing, Reidar Vissar notes helpfully that "there are probably few spots on this planet where the search for mono-causality is more futile than Basra." Fair enough.

The bottom line is that for whatever series of reasons, the Maliki government and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) have clearly come to some sort of tactical alliance to try to cripple the power of the Sadrists and the JAM. Further complicating the picture is an emailed postscript to Vissar's original article on the Basra offensive, which highlighted a statement from Fadhila, a major power among the Shiite in Basra, criticizing the operation and urging its conclusion.

In the end, these intra-Shiite machinations, while fascinating, are difficult to fully parse from afar and less relevant than the question of what exactly the United States hopes to gain from green-lighting and supporting the current operations. Contrary to the claims of some administration officials that the Iraqi offensive was launched without consultation with the United States, Iraqi officials have been signaling their intentions to launch an offensive in Basra for weeks. It is farcical to pretend that the Maliki government and the Iraqi Army could undertake an operation of this scope without the acquiescence of the United States.

The U.S. military has also been directly involved in helping to suppress the spillover effects in Baghdad and has now taken a more prominent role in combating the emerging violence in Sadr City. A British military official has indicated that coalition aircraft have launched airstrikes in Basra in support of the offensive. One is left wondering what the United States could possibly be trying to accomplish through this political and military support.

A possible explanation of U.S. motivations is a desire to neutralize Moqtada al-Sadr's power base by forcing a wedge between Sadr, who extended his ceasefire order in February 2008, and the more militant among the JAM. However, such an approach underestimates the constraints upon Sadr in having to answer to a mass movement and could push Sadr to renounce the ceasefire in an effort to salvage his credibility among the militia fighters. Even if the United States is successful in discrediting Sadr in the eyes of his loyalists, such an approach is still lacking because it is based upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the JAM, which, in spite of its often predatory practices, still maintains wide appeal among the urban Shiite poor -- with or without Sadr at its head.

The JAM ceasefire has played a large role in tamping down violence, particularly in Baghdad. If the current violence results in a renunciation of the ceasefire or complete fracturing of chains of authority, JAM militia fighters still have serious capacity to enflame the atmosphere and rekindle widespread violence. Initial reports on the fighting indicate that far from the spent force described by some war proponents, the JAM is still a formidable urban fighting force.

The U.S. military has limited the potential for sectarian violence by cordoning off neighborhoods within Baghdad and minimizing sectarian flashpoints. This segregation has also been reinforced by the widespread ethnic cleansing that took place during the bloody phases of the sectarian civil war that marked 2006-2007. However, even if the immediate targets of JAM militiamen in the aftermath of the current operation are rival Shiite militias and the Iraqi Army, it is not particularly difficult to foresee that the violence could spill over into wider sectarian conflicts that would reverse recent security gains.

The offensive comes at a sensitive political juncture as General David H. Petraeus is slated April 8 to offer testimony before Congress on the current progress of U.S. military efforts and the security and stability of Iraq. The testimony will play a major role in shaping the political debate on Iraq that is sure to play a central role in the upcoming general election campaign. Any serious reversals in the security situation could go a long way in shaping the tenor of the election debate and influencing the discussion on future troop withdrawals, particularly since withdrawals from peak U.S. force levels are already under way.

Against this fragile backdrop it is puzzling that the United States would endorse such a high-risk operation, potentially jeopardizing the security situation and imperiling efforts to reach a national political accommodation, which was the animating rationale behind the troop surge from the start.

Michael Wahid Hanna is a Program Officers at Tthe Century Foundation. This article was first published by World Politics Review.